Disaster Was Bound to Happen
The Sept. 4 issue of US News and World Report has a good little article titled "A Disaster Long in the Making". It is actually not an article, but rather an excerpt from the book Path of Destruction: The Devastation of New Orleans and the Coming Age fo Superstorms, by John McQuaid and Mark Schleifstein.
It first briefly describes the New Orleans area relative to the sea, much of which I already knew. But what I found most interesting were the horrific details of the negligence of government officials in properly planning for "the big one" and the evasion of the facts of reality concerning the risks of that region. Here is the part I am talking about:
When computer modeling of storm surges improved in the 1980s and 1990s, however, it became clear that even a weak hurricane could put virtually any point under water. Thousands, maybe tens of thousands could end up dead. Hundreds of thousands could be trapped on rooftops. New Orleans itself could be destroyed.Wow... assuming that is true... Wow! I understand that disaster preparedness is a risk calculation, and that resources (people, time, etc.) are always limited. But given the evidence, the studies, the articles, the advice -- over many decades (including a National Geographic article I believe the year before Katrina), it is just amazing how government leaders and others acted as they did, and set up New Orleans for Katrina.
The models made explicit one of the strangest trade-offs in American history. Faced with the risk of New Orleans being destroyed, the policy of the U.S. government was to throw up its hands. Local governments could try to save as many lives as possible, but the city itself would be sacrificed. Higher, stronger levees could eliminate the risk, or at least reduce it, but that option would never be a priority with the corps or Congress. The corps was building its system as originally designed. It hadn't failed yet, and that was good enough.
As emergency professionals gathered regularly for hurricane planning, New Orleans officials seemed curiously uninterested in the most urgent issue they faced. In 2004, a federally funded exercise called Hurricane Pam had tested the government response to a catastrophic flood of New Orleans. But while the city sent a representative or two to Hurricane Pam exercises, it played no real leadership role and did little to act on the recommendations. During the National Hurricane Conference in early 2005, various participants discussed and debated how to get the people out of New Orleans, but no city officials bothered to attend.
It makes me wonder what thinking is going into the rebuilding efforts, both of the levees, but also of the city itself. Of course, I generally wonder why people rebuild houses over and over in hurricane areas and flood zones. It always the first thing they say when interviewed on TV after the disaster, things like "Horrible, just horrible. But... we'll... rebuild. We've got to." Umm... no you don't... at least not in those exact locations!
Labels: environment, us_gov_politics

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